(Published in “The National Interest Online” (“Help From Our Friends”, April 2010; on the website of People`s Daily (China), May 2010; “Golos Rossii”, CA-NEWS.org, May 2010; in “Society”, № 354 Summer 2010, July 2010; on the website of Centre for Social-Conservative Politics (in German), July 2010, in “Contemporary International Relations”, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. Vol. 20, No. 4, Jul./Aug. 2010; in “International Journal of Decision Ethics on Global Conflicts, Higher Education, Business and Economics”. Fall 2010. Volume VII.1. Sponsor: Department of Educational Studies, Oxford University, UK. Publisher: Global Scholarly Publications, New York).
The decision by the president Barack Obama to send up to 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan clearly confirms the fact that the Afghan dilemma comes to the fore in world politics.
Its global status is due not only to the fact that the resurgent activity of Taliban and Al-Qaeda once again makes Afghanistan become a zone with high destabilizing potential, but also the fact that the Afghan conflict directly affects the vital interests of virtually all major global centers of power.
This in turn creates a fairly unique situation where often divergent interests of leading global and regional factors are beginning to converge at a common point – the need for joint action to accelerate the blockade of unwanted developments in Afghanistan and work out new measures of stabilization and recovery of this country.
Opinion on the necessity for immediate consolidation of international efforts around Afghanistan is fully shared by the countries of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, which has quite a long southern border, and plays an important role in maintaining stability and economic development of the northern Afghan provinces. For Uzbekistan, it is important from the standpoint of regional and global security to see cooperation, not competition of leading forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Uzbek think-tank experts believe that for the solution of Afghan problem and the annihilation of destabilizing processes influence, diverging from it in waves throughout the world, it is appropriate for all interested parties to approach it in the first place with a pragmatic rational position.
In the expert community it has become a kind of axiomatic assertion that Afghanistan and Central Asia represent a rivalry space between the United States in conjunction with NATO, Russia and China, as well as regional-level players – Iran, Pakistan, India. It is difficult to deny that each of them has its own range of interests. However, in parallel with this view has increasingly strengthened the position of those who believe that the geopolitical rivalry in the classical notion as a "Great Game" in contemporary conditions is counterproductive, because its outcome can be a loss for all parties involved.
From the view of Eurasian geopolitics in its traditional understanding of Hartland, current situation around Afghanistan seems to be very unique. If the traditional view of competition provides at least two key states involved in control of the Heartland, at the present time all the key players are faced with a force that opposes all at the same time and has no distinct local structure. That force acts kind of a "Network organism", consisting of numerous terrorist and religious groups and movements united around the Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hizb-i Islami, the Islamic Movement of Turkestan, and many other groups.
In the case the network structure copes to establish control over Afghanistan, then with high probability can be predicted increase in attempts to spread its influence in the neighboring regions as a minimum. The security and stability of many countries will be jeopardized.
Uzbekistan already faced a similar course of events, when establishing by the Taliban control over the northern regions of Afghanistan resulted in the invasion of Islamists in 1999-2000.
It is possible that the return of the Islamists will threaten China, which has problems in the western territories inhabited by Muslims. Quite predictably increase in activity of Islamists in the North Caucasian regions of Russia, because they will receive a significant inflow of foreign manpower, material and military-technical assistance. Pakistan will face a direct threat to its stability, where entire neighborhoods, such as South Waziristan, have turned into a base area for major groups "Tehrik-e Taliban- Pakistan", as well as India, with its troubled Kashmir.
Iran could not avoid problems either, which has traditionally had a difficult relationship with the Taliban, which in 1999 murdered several Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif, which then put the region under the threat of full-scale conflict between Tehran and the Taliban.
As for the U.S. and Europe for them once again could become very real prospects of clashes with acts of terrorism against civilians and civilian infrastructure. And if the West now has the ability to deter terrorist groups due to being in Afghanistan, the withdrawal from that country would limit its ability to prevent the transformation of Afghan territory to the center of planning and execution of terrorist operations. Here should be added a high probability of further growth of the drug shaft, which has already covered many regions of the world.
Based on the considerations of a pragmatic nature, only the possibility of such threats should spur all concerned parties to full scale cooperation. In principle, we have recently observed positive movement in this direction, as evidenced by the fairly rapid agreement on the opening of the Northern Supply Route of non-lethal goods for the group of NATO in Afghanistan.
This strategically important agreement, which on the one hand, allows NATO to diversify its supply lines and reduce dependence on the Pakistan`s route, on the other hand, it serves as a platform to build real cooperation between the NATO countries, Russia, Central Asian states, and above all, Uzbekistan.
Meanwhile, the agreement on transit of cargo may ideally be the starting point also for kick-off of the closer consideration process by all concerned parties of prospects for solving the Afghan problem and rehabilitation of the country.
Henry Kissinger in his article "Deployments and Diplomacy" points out to the timeliness of establishing such a dialogue . However, American expert is still somewhat pessimistic about the willingness of the regional countries to take on this dialogue. According to him “each of mentioned powers (China, Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan) has considerable potential to defend its interests. Nevertheless all of them to some degree prefer to take on the Afghan conflict bystander”.
What is the reason for such passivity? Judging by the ideas reflected in the article, a restraining influence, of course, has logic of "Great Game". Kissinger, in principle, admits its existence, pointing out that in the relations between the countries around Afghanistan there is “a problem of myopic temptation to benefit from the failures of an opponent”.
However, the overall situation still is not so hopeless. The regional states and the world`s leading players enjoy positive experience of dialogue on the Afghan problem, as evidenced by the successful activity of the Contact Group "6+2" on Afghanistan in 1999, initiated by Uzbekistan. The group under the auspices of the UN at the time included the states bordering with Afghanistan – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, China and Russia-USA.
Today, Uzbekistan again offers under the auspices of the UN to revive this format and to include NATO. Thus, the group will be "6+3". The idea of establishing a contact group was announced by the President Islam Karimov at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.
There have been lively discussions around the idea, and it has already got its supporters. For instance, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute under Johns Hopkins University professor S. Frederick Starr within the framework of his visit to Uzbekistan in November 2009 noted that “the Contact Group "6+2" is the most effective mechanism for the rebuilding process of Afghanistan and a peaceful political dialogue between all intra-warring parties”.
Of course, the idea also has its opponents, but the reality is that the debates can last forever, while chances of resolving the Afghan dilemma are desperately being missed. The fact is that the problem of 2011 as a "sword of Damocles" hangs over all interested parties of modern Afghan drama. Just from this year the countdown for withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan begins, as stated Barack Obama, and entering into this 1.5-year period, we find ourselves in a situation of total uncertainty, a situation of continuous "if..."
"If suddenly during the declared period NATO will not be able to defeat the Taliban, how would further develop the situation in Afghanistan and the region? Will the withdrawal of troops take place?" "If the Karzai government and the Afghan army will not take responsibility for the control of the country, will the NATO countries revise the format of their participation in the Afghan mission and relationship with the current regime in Kabul?" "If for 1.5 year attempts to conduct economic reforms will fail, where will turn the sympathy of the Afghan people to?" There are a great number of such questions.
To clarify the situation of uncertainty, it is right necessary to establish as soon as possible a mechanism for multilateral dialogue, in the framework of which there could be started a movement to achieve at least three large-scale inter-related goals.
The first goal, as is seen, should be creation of an atmosphere of trust between all actors in Eurasian geopolitics, related to Afghanistan. As already mentioned, interests of all parties to prevent expansion of the influence of terrorist groups coincide in essence, because otherwise each of them may incur some losses relating to national security. Only one single step is missing toward reaching a consensus, but, as practice shows, it can be achieved only through an open multilateral dialogue.
The second goal is very well formulated by Henry Kissinger, according to whom "the aim should be to turn Afghanistan – through the efforts of the international community – into a "terrorists-free zone, just as during the dominance of Europe in world politics neutrality of some countries was provided by international treaties".
In fact, this is a key task in terms of the Afghan problem settlement at regional level, but its achievement will be possible only after achieving the first goal: creating an atmosphere of complete trust between all actors.
If Afghanistan will not turn into a "terrorists-free zone", which is actually impossible without a full coordination of all border states on blocking borders and militants-, weapons-, drugs- and precursors trafficking channels, even sending of 100,000 additional soldiers to this country will not solve the problem, since the problem of preventing restoration of militants’ resource base is not solved.
In this connection I would like a bit to dwell on a popular idea among analytical circles that the best is to provide 100% control over 50% or 75% of Afghan territory, than 50-75% control over the whole country. Is this acceptable in Afghanistan?
Even if we assume that the full control over 75% of the territory is provided, it will just mean postponement of the final solution of the problem. Controlling 25% of the territory by terrorist groups would mean that they will in any case have a base for capacity building and training new militants. As for military confrontation one can predict with certainty, that the established balance of power will be quite fragile.
We should not forget that there is not a classic confrontation between two military groups in Afghanistan, but between a regular army and a "network structure", where the front line often has a relative nature. Therefore a question of full control of a percent of the territory should be approached with caution.
The third large-scale goal of a multilateral dialogue could be development of a conceptual vision for management reform and economic revival of Afghanistan. Today it is obvious that without international aid Kabul is not able to solve the most pressing problems of the country. Until now the international community has mainly acted through large financial injections into the Afghan economy, army and state apparatus. However, the effectiveness of this strategy was not as high as one expects, largely because of corruption and lack of a well-considered development program.
Meanwhile, it seems more reasonable to create such conditions in Afghanistan, in which it could be able to create own sources of incomes capable of becoming a significant alternative to international aid. This is possible only through the gradual integration of Afghanistan into the regional economic and transport structures.
Uzbekistan in its cooperation with Afghanistan acts just in this manner, as is demonstrated by construction of a railroad connecting the Uzbek border town Termez with Mazar-e Sharif, the largest economic center of northern Afghanistan.
The tender for the construction of the railroad was won by the State Joint-Stock Railway Company "Uzbekiston Temir Yollari". The project is implemented through a grant from the Asian Development Bank amounting to $165 million and own funds of the Government of Afghanistan in the amount of $5 million. The construction of the railway will be completed before June 2010.
This railroad will enable the Afghan business to get the shortest access not only to the Uzbek market, but also to the markets of Central Asia, Russia and China, which itself will become an incentive for increased production of export-oriented Afghan goods.
In principle, the Afghan problem now reached a point, where an alternative to the speedy establishment of an open multilateral dialogue does not virtually exist. The priority of the military component of NATO policy in Afghanistan has proven its effectiveness at the initial stage, but in recent years it has stalled, a clear indication of which is the revival of the Taliban.
The international community has invested considerable financial resources in Afghanistan, but this has not led to a fundamental change. Afghanistan remains a poor state and is seen by investors as a zone of high risk. As long as Afghanistan remains poor, the Taliban will always have a human resource to replenish its ranks. The worse the economic situation, the more recruits for the Taliban will be available, which in turn will force NATO to send new troops to deter violence. It is like a movement inside a "vicious circle" that is impossible to break off, unless the prevailing logic of consideration of the Afghan issue as a "thing in itself" will be dropped.
The Afghan problem is inherently a much wider issue and its solution should be found both inside Afghanistan and in the problems of the region as a whole. Fortunately, the understanding of this ever more appears among the international expert and political circles, and this gives us hope that a multilateral discussion format, including the one proposed by Uzbekistan, will be launched in the foreseeable future.
Eight years ago thanks to a confidential multilateral cooperation there was a success in starting the process of stabilization and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Why not try to run again this proven mechanism, while there is still time for it?
The Afghan issue in light of the geopolitical interests of Uzbekistan
